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Abstract

The protection of trademarks, when it raises a conflict with the protection of geographical
indications is one of the most contested issues on the international trade and intellectual
property arena. In European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs a WTO panel was faced with this
issue. The panel report gives some insight into what international trademark law
mandates as well as some pointers on how conflicts between different IP rights should be
solved. This article attempts a deeper analysis of the coexistence of rights in the
framework of the TRIPS Agreement that will inevitably grow in importance, when traderelated aspects start permeating all intellectual property issues in WTO fora.
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The article adopts a new approach to analyzing international trademark law. The Western
concept of trademarks as property is contrasted to another concept of property that is
derived from the use of property. While the property discussion in itself is not new to
trademark law, nor is a discussion on the significance of trademark use in trademark law,
here, the discussions are combined and refined in an attempt to provide an analytical
framework for deciding international trademark cases.
It is argued that the property right in a trademark should be assessed through how it is
used, and any finding of infringement hinges upon whether the use of the trademark by
its proprietor is unlawfully affected by a third party’s use of an identical or similar sign.
Informed by property theory and international law, the analytical framework is applied to
the issues raised in the panel report. This leads to the conclusion that the panel report is
flawed in certain respects.
I

INTRODUCTION

International intellectual property law explicitly merged with international trade law in
1995 by way of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(the TRIPS Agreement).1 Although both fields of law have a long international history,
each operates on fundamentally different premises. While international trade law focuses
on removing trade barriers, intellectual property rights are in themselves territorially
limited, and hence by definition barriers to trade. The ‘merger’ was accompanied by an
unforeseen depth of commitment by sovereign nations to an international organization,
the World Trade Organization (WTO), including the rules set forth by it.
While bringing new subject matter within the trade regime broadened the scope of
international economic regulation, the enforcement mechanism established within the
framework of the WTO also seemingly rendered international trade law more pervasive
than ever in relation to its subjects.2 Thus, at least from a formal point of view the

1

The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter the TRIPS Agreement), April 15,
1994, US source, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
2
The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance 1-5 (Gary P. Sampson ed.,
2001).
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international trade regime of today is a system governed by the rule of law, not that of
diplomacy.3
These changes naturally trigger a number of questions. What is the scope of the TRIPS
Agreement and how should its provisions be interpreted under existing rules of
international law? Do national legislators continue to serve a function within the
international trade regime other than being mere implementing organs? In trademark
terms, is the minimum standard of trademark protection set forth in the TRIPS
Agreement in reality a maximum standard of other IP protection? To what extent does the
international level of trademark protection set forth in the TRIPS Agreement restrict the
ability of the national legislator, under international law, to regulate 1) within the area of
trademark law and 2) in other areas of law?
Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement sets forth the minimum standard of trademark
protection that Member States are obliged to afford. However, Article 17 of the TRIPS
Agreement provides that Member States are allowed to provide for limited exceptions to
the afforded rights. What these provisions entail as well as their relationship to other
provisions of the TRIPS agreement (namely Art. 24 that affords protection for
Geographical Indications (GIs)) was the issue faced by a WTO panel in European
Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural
Products and Foodstuffs (GI-report).4

3

Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law 25 (2003); John H. Jackson, The
Jurisprudence of GATT & WTO 181 (2000) (hereinafter Jackson 2000); and Martin Wolf, What
the World Needs from the Multilateral Trading System 183-208, 185, in The Role of the World
Trade Organization in Global Governance (Gary P. Sampson ed., 2001).
4
Panel report, European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications
for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 7.632, WT/DS290/R and WT/DS174/R (March 15, 2005)
((hereinafter WT/DS290/R) All references to specific sections are from report WT/DS290/R .The
Panel’s findings regarding the trademark claims were identical although the complaints were
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The protection of trademarks, when it is in conflict with the protection of GIs and vice
versa is one of the most contested issues on the international trade and intellectual
property arena. The GI-report gives some insight into what international trademark law
mandates as well as some pointers on how conflicts between different IP rights should be
solved. This article attempts a deeper analysis of the coexistence of rights in the
framework of the TRIPS Agreement that will inevitably grow in importance, when traderelated aspects start permeating all IP issues in WTO fora.
As existing international trademark law has not evolved to fill the market regulatory
function it serves on the national level, this article adopts a new approach to analyzing
international trademark law. First, an analogy to different concepts of property, as
revealed by three cases around the world highlights when and how trademarks can be
viewed as property. The Western concept of trademarks as property (derived from
possession) is then contrasted to another, namely Maori, concept of property that is
derived from the use of property.
The property discussion in itself is not new to trademark law in the United States or the
rest of the world nor is a discussion on the significance of trademark use5 in trademark
law. Here, however, the discussions are combined and refined in an attempt to provide an
analytical framework for deciding international trademark cases. This article is not
slightly different.) interpreting “this section” to mean that Article 24 (3) and (5) only apply in
relation to section III and geographical indications. See infra footnote 163.
5
The meaning and purpose of the requirement of trademark use in contemporary trademark law
is and has been widely debated in the United States as well as in Europe, due to a wide range of
contradictory judicial decisions. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer
Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 777 (2004); Ilanah Simon, Embellishment: Trade
Mark Use Triumph or Decorative Disaster, E.I.P.R. 2006, 28(6), 321-328; Graeme B. Dinwoodie
&. Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927996. These articles use the term trade mark use to refer to, whether
and to what extent so called non-trademark use would be considered a defense in trademark law.
Thus, they focus on the defendant’s use. Although this article is very much concerned with the
significance of trademark use to our understanding of trademark law, it is not intended as an
addition to this discussion. In this article the right holder’s trademark use is significant.
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primarily concerned with the defendant’s use of a sign as a trademark, nor on the
proprietor’s right to property. Instead this article argues that the property right in a
trademark should be assessed through how it is used, and any finding of infringement
hinges upon whether the use of the trademark by its proprietor is unlawfully affected by a
third party’s use of an identical or similar sign. The focus is neither on the proprietor nor
on the mark itself, but on the protected use.
Second, the analytical framework is supported by an analysis of the international legal
system and third, the analytical framework, informed by property theory and international
law, is applied to the issues raised in the GI-report. This leads to the conclusion that the
GI-report is flawed in certain respects.
Hence, this article argues that the text of the TRIPS Agreement, when infused by the
general principles of public international law, although seemingly vague, provides a
binding analytical framework for assessing the legitimate scope of trademark protection
under international law. The existing analytical framework can be derived from three
sources:
1) The minimum standard of protection set forth in the agreement (art. 16 (1));
2) the degree of derogation allowed from the afforded rights under art. 17 and;
3) the context and structure of the TRIPS Agreement.6

6

A panel should address the questions in this order, i.e. from the specific to the general. See
Appellate Body Report, Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 40, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996); and Appellate Body Report, United StatesProhibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 116, 121, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). In
this sense the specific provision and the issue it regulates constrains and guides interpretation on
the more general levels. However, the general level provides a background and framework for
choosing between alternative interpretations regarding the meaning of the terms used in a
specific provision.
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The analytical framework rests on a contextual7 approach to interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement. Just as the meaning of each word in each provision rests not only on the
ordinary meaning of the word, but also on the context in which it is used, the meaning of
each provision should be ascertained in conjunction with the other provisions of the
treaty. This article argues that an overly literal interpretation, with the effect of drawing
arbitrary lines between different intellectual property rights (IPRs), is inconsistent with
the TRIPS Agreement.8
Section II explores the nature of the rights guaranteed trademark owners by article 16 (1)
of the TRIPS Agreement by scrutinizing trademark rights as a legal concept. The article
approaches this question by way of analogy to property law; it is asked to what extent
trademark rights can be viewed as property.9 How do different understandings of

7

According to its legal definition context refers to “the surrounding text of a word or passage,
used to determine the meaning of that word or passage”. Black’s Law Dictionary 268 (Abridged
th
8 ed. 2005). By contextual I however refer to something more than mere text; I also refer to the
nd
structure of the agreement. The Oxford English Dictionary 820-821 (2 ed., Vol III (1989) defines
context as “ the connected structure of a writing or composition” or “The whole structure of a
connected passage regarded in its bearing upon any of the parts which constitute it; the parts
which immediately precede or follow any particular passage or ‘text’ and determine its meaning.”
By “a contextual approach” I therefore refer to more than the literal text of the agreements,
although the text itself remains the primary source. The text is also evidence of the fact that
agreement was reached as well as the extent and scope of agreement, which like any agreement
bears legal significance. The approach is premised on the intent of the parties to abide by the
terms of the agreement. While the objective and purpose of the agreement can be indicative of a
preferred interpretation (i.e. the interpretation that furthers the objective and purpose of the treaty
should prevail over one that runs contrary to it), it cannot operate on its own to fill in gaps in the
treaty. This is the primary difference to the teleological approach, at least as used by the
European Court of Justice (See Paul Craig, Grainne de Burca, EU Law, Texts, Cases and
rd
Materials 98, (3 edition 2003)). Furthermore, the objective and purpose of the treaty is to be
ascertained based on the complete text of the treaty as read according to the general principles
of treaty interpretation, not based on the legislative history or any partisan source recollecting
legislative intent. Albeit a line drawn in water, the contextual approach only travels back in time to
ascertain how the “legislators” viewed the final draft of the treaty; what they objectively and
collectively thought they had achieved, not what their individual objectives were in negotitating it.
8
WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.632: interpreting “this section” to mean that Art. 24 (3) and (5)
only apply in relation to section III and geographical indications.
9
This article does not ask whether or not trademarks are property; it is the starting point of this
article that they are. Compare to Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A
Property Paradigm 5, 54 Duke L.J. 1 (2004). Unlike Carrier, who fashioned remedies for United
States’ IP law by introducing additional defenses (Ibid at 95-106, 124-127, 134-139 and 142-144),
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property influence interpretation of international trademark law? This analysis serves as a
foundation for later ascertaining how viewing trademark rights as property affects the
trademark right when interacting with other interests in society, i.e. clashing with other
equally fundamental interests.
Section III focuses on the relationship between the explicit limitations set forth in Article
16(1), and the limitations that are allowed by virtue of Article 17 in light of the GIreport.10 The GI-panel was faced with a complaint where a European Community
regulation on protection of geographical indications (GIs) was alleged to encroach upon
the minimum level of trademark protection mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.
Section IV approaches the TRIPS Agreement through the interpretive lens of general
rules of international law and international trade law.11 According to customary
international law, treaty provisions should on the one hand be narrowly interpreted, but
on the other hand they should not be interpreted so as to render the provisions ineffectual.
Each provision of the treaty was intended to have effect and an interpretation giving some
provisions more effect than others is thus inconsistent with the general objective and
purpose of the treaty. Much like WTO panels should not act as an international
legislature through activist interpretation, WTO panels should not stall progress through
“passivist” interpretation; shying away in areas of political contention.12 Instead WTO

the international arena requires a different remedy. This is because only common law countries
traditionally provide for explicit defenses in the statutory text. In the civil law world (the vast
majority of the Member States of the WTO), national trademark laws only include implicit
reference to limitations of afforded rights in a trademark. Statutes that are seemingly heavily tilted
in the proprietor’s favor therefore require a more potent counterweight. Nevertheless, I argue that
my solution; a new contextual approach to trademark law, applies equally to the United States
and the common law world, where the same problems exist albeit to a lesser degree.
10
WT/DS290/R, supra note4.
11
Pauwelyn, supra note 3, at 25.
12
An overly formalistic and literal approach to a politically contested issue amounts to an attempt
to hide behind the law that distorts rather than clarifies existing international law.
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panels should interpret the TRIPS Agreement and its provisions in the legal framework
and practical context in which they operate. Absent express wording on the specific issue
to the contrary a hierarchy of intellectual property rights should not be presumed to have
been built into the TRIPS Agreement. The agreement itself, its mere adoption as well as
its structure, supports a presumption of equality.13
In section V the analytical framework produced by this analysis is developed to define
the scope and limits of what constitutes the minimum standard of trademark protection
under international law. The article argues that the GI-panel’s reading of the TRIPS
Agreement is counterintuitive; it creates a hierarchy of IPRs that would require Member
States to restructure their protective schemes accordingly. It is further argued that the
TRIPS Agreement – implicitly and explicitly – stands for a presumption of co-existence
of rights and the provisions of the agreement should be interpreted accordingly.
Likewise, the TRIPS Agreement does not exist in a vacuum, which should be reflected in
the interpretation of it.

II

THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF ARTICLE 16(1): Trademark Rights As a
Legal Construct

II.A

Trademarks Rights As Property

This article assumes that trademark rights are property rights. However, this leads us no
further than knowing that real property is property. The property-label only has meaning
in the context of property law, which regulates what rights and obligations the
13

This is not intended to argue that all IPRs are afforded the same level of protection merely that
all IPRs are afforded protection and therefore should be considered equally worthy of protection.
Measuring worthiness by the afforded level of protection gives a skewed view of the TRIPS
Agreement, since it strongly favors old IPRs over new IPRs. One of the groundbreaking elements
of the TRIPS Agreement was to modernize the existing international IP regime by way of
providing additional protection for old IPRs and new protection where old IPRs have proven
insufficient (e.g. protection of trade secrets and geographical indications).
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designation as property entails.14 This section seeks to ascertain how a property right can
be defined at the time of allocation of the right, as well as later when conflicts with other
rights emerge. In trademark terms, we seek guidance in defining the object of the right,
i.e. an answer to the following question: what do you own when you own a trademark?
Three cases, one decided by the Constitutional Court of South Africa and two by the
European Court of Human Rights serve as illustrative tools. Each case involves a nontraditional taking15 of property without compensation. Hence, the cases raised issues
concerning 1) whether the object constituted constitutionally protected property and 2)
whether it nonetheless could legitimately be subject to a taking without compensation. In
other words, when evaluating a proprietary interest one must always ascertain whether
the object and holder satisfy the requirements for receiving protection (compare to Article
16(1)) and if answered in the affirmative, whether societal considerations of necessity
still outweigh the individual interest in receiving protection in the circumstances of each
individual case (compare to Article 17).
In First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank versus The Commissioner, SA Revenue
Services16, three leased cars had been seized by the Revenue Service for the lessee’s
unpaid customs debts. FNB, the owner of the cars, challenged the government’s authority
under the constitution to sell17 the seized vehicles, when they are the property of a third

14

Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 29, 31 (1988): on ownership and on the
concept of a property system.
15
A taking by means of direct or indirect regulatory action that equally affects all citizens to which
the law applies, as opposed to the individual condemnation and seizure of specific property by
administrative or legislative action.
16
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (hereinafter CCT
19/01), Constitutional Court of South Africa, CCT 19/01, May 16, 2002, available on-line at
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za.
17
That is, FNB contests the seizure of the cars in the first place (25(1)), and contends that the
taking amounts to an expropriation for which they should be compensated (25(2)).
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party.18 Section 25 of the South African Constitution contains a negative guarantee of
property rights in the form of protection against arbitrary deprivations. Although a large
portion of section 25 concerns issues regarding real property it expressly states that
property is not limited to land.19 After extensive theoretical and comparative analysis of
section 25 the court held the provision that authorized the sale was unconstitutional.
The court concluded, on the one hand, that the protection of property in the negative does
not include an express guarantee of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.20
On the other hand, the court acknowledged that a guarantee of the right to hold property
(once lawfully acquired) is implicitly recognized by most democracies as falling within
the negative right.21 The same right extends to both natural and juristic persons;22 it is
however not absolute, but subject to limitation based on societal considerations.23
In order to reflect this nature of the right, the approach to the interpretation of section 25
has to be contextual. In the words of the court “[t]he subsections…must not be construed
in isolation, but in the context of the other provisions of section 25 and their historical
context, and indeed in the context of the Constitution as a whole.”24 The court further
notes, citing Professor Van der Walt that it is necessary “to move away from a static,
typically private-law conceptualist view of the constitution as a guarantee of the status
quo to a dynamic, typically public-law view of the constitution as an instrument for social
18

CCT 19/01, supra note 16, at para. 2-5.
Section 25(4) (b) of the South African Constitution.
20
Compare infra in section III how the GI-Panel correctly defines the bundle of rights that the
trademark owner legitimately controls.
21
CCT 19/01, supra note 16, at para 48.
22
CCT 19/01, supra note 16, at para 41 and 45.
23
CCT 19/01, supra note 16, at para 49.
24
CCT 19/01, supra note 16, at para 49. Compare to the definition of a contextual approach in
footnote 7 supra. In referring to the interpretive guidance of history the court does not intend to
say that the laws during the apartheid period should guide the court in the interpretation of the
modern South African Constitution. To the contrary the contextual approach seeks to learn from
history and determines the intentions of lawmakers in light of historical fact, i.e. facts that have
been objectively and collectively determined.
19
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change and transformation under auspices [and…control] of entrenched constitutional
values”, when considering the purpose and content of the property clause.25 Hence,
property should also serve the public good.26
As an initial matter the court notes that any interference with the use, enjoyment or
exploitation of private property involves some degree of deprivation of the title holder’s
rights. A deprivation per se therefore cannot trigger a duty to compensate. The invalidity
of a deprivation thus hinges upon whether it can be viewed as arbitrary.27 Arbitrariness
should be evaluated in the legislative context to which the prohibition against “arbitrary”
deprivation has to be applied as well as to the nature and extent of the deprivation.28
More specifically it is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between the means
employed and the ends sought as well as the relationship between the purpose for the
deprivation and 1) the person whose property is affected, 2) the nature of the property and
3) the extent of the deprivation. A more compelling purpose needs to be established when
the deprivation affects land as opposed to other property as well as when the deprivation
embraces all the incidents of ownership as opposed to affecting only some rights in the
bundle of rights.29
Similarly, in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom30 the European Court of
Human Rights agreed with the petitioner that the English law on adverse possession as
applied to them violated their fundamental right to protection of property. Under the law
25

CCT 19/01, supra note 16, at para. 52. The court cites AJ van der Walt The Constitutional
Property Clause 87 (1997).
26
The court gives a number of illustrative examples of how private property is subject to
regulation through zoning laws for residential, public safety, environmental and efficiency
purposes.
27
CCT 19/01, supra note 16, at para. 57 and 61.
28
CCT 19/01, supra note 16, at para 66.
29
CCT 19/01, supra note 16, at para 100.
30
J.A.Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, ECHR44302/02, Nov. 15, 2005.
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of adverse possession the possessor can acquire lawful title (by way of initiating a
registration procedure), if the owner has not asserted rights of ownership against the
possessor of land in 12 years. Petitioner, a company, was the registered owner of 23
hectares of agricultural land. After the expiry of a grazing agreement in 1984 between
petitioner and the Grahams, the Grahams continued to graze the land without permission
until 1999. The action before the court arose when the Grahams applied to the
registration authority for transfer of title pursuant to the law of adverse possession and
petitioner lost lawful title to the land.
Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights31 secures the right
of “peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions”, except when deprivation is in the public
interest as provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.32
According to previous case-law by the European Court of Human Rights a deprivation
must comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue a legitimate means reasonably
proportionate to the aim sought in order to satisfy the general principle of peaceful
enjoyment.33 Nonetheless, the court recognized that the national legislatures should be
shown great deference in determining how to further the public interest and such
determination can only be overturned if it is “manifestly without foundation”.34

31

The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
Its Five Protocols (hereinafter ECHR), Nov. 4, 1950 as last amended Jan. 20, 1966, S. SopS
18/1990
(Finland’s
treaty
series),
deposited
at
the
European
Council
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html.
32
Id. at Article 15: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce
such laws as it deems necessary to control the se of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
33
Bruncrona v. Finland § 65, European Court of Human Rights, ECHR- 41673/98, Nov. 16, 2004.
See also J.A.Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 30, at § 42, 46.
34
J.A.Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 30, at § 43- 44.
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The existence of alternatives as such is not enough to render the contested legislation
unjustified. The proper inquiry is whether the interference strikes “a fair balance between
the demand of the public or general interest of the community and the requirements of the
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”35 Although a deprivation of property
without compensation can be legitimate, the compensation terms set forth in the relevant
legislation are material to the assessment of fairness, and ultimately the legitimacy of the
deprivation.36
The court stressed that unlike other property that is inherently subject to restriction,
qualification or limitation, the petitioner’s title to land was absolute. The mere fact that a
law of general applicability was in effect at the time of acquisition did not inherently
limit petitioner’s property right. Whether a law of general applicability can ever do so
depends on whether the law can be seen as qualifying or limiting the right, i.e. take effect,
at the moment of acquisition rather than pending certain circumstances at some time in
the future.37 Due to the fact that petitioner had registered title to the land and the public
interest therefore was weaker than in the case of unregistered property, the transfer of
title to the possessors without compensation was greatly disproportionate to the total
revocation of petitioner’s property interest.38 In the end the decision seemed to turn on
the fact that the law did not require that the owner be given notice during the 12-year
time-period.39

35

J.A.Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 30, § 45-46.
J.A.Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 30, § 47, 46.
37
J.A.Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 30, § 50-51.
38
J.A.Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 30, § 69-71.
39
J.A.Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 30, § 73. The court at this juncture
placed great weight on the fact that the act had been amended in 2002 to include a requirement
of notice after 10 years of possession. Throughout the opinion the court emphasized that the
applicant was deprived of 1) property 2) without compensation 3) without the ability to contest the
decision in court.
36
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Of the seven justices on the court, three dissented. The dissenters stressed that ownership
carries not only rights, but duties as well. The duties imposed on petitioner in this case
could not be viewed as excessive or unreasonable, since petitioners were professional real
estate developers and therefore should have had full knowledge of the law as well as the
minimal steps required to look after their interests. Since the convention only imposed a
minimum standard of protection and it is open to national legislatures to heighten the
level of protection, the majority’s decision was unduly influenced by the legislature’s
decision to modernize the law of adverse possession.40
In Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal41 the European Court of Human Rights concluded
that a trademark application can give rise to a protectable property interest based on
legitimate expectations.42 Anheuser-Busch argued that the enjoyment of a property right
afforded at the time of application could not be disturbed absent specific law to this
point.43 A Czech holder of a GI had successfully opposed the trademark application in
extensive opposition proceedings.44 Consequently, the trademark registration never
issued.
The court concluded that a conditional right can be subject to non-realization if it
conflicts with the rights of third parties, provided that legislation to this effect is clear and
precise at the time of acquisition of the right.45 The mere fact that some protection is

40

J.A.Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 30, joint dissenting opinion of judges
Maruste, Garlicki and Borrego Borrego § 1-3.
41
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, European Court of Human Rights, ECHR- 73049/01, Oct
2005.
42
Id. at § 47.
43
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, supra note 41, at § 32. Anheuser-Busch argued that a
decision of the Portuguese Supreme Court to deny registration of the Budweiser trademark
amounted to an expropriation of a property right in violation of Art. 1.1 of the European
Convention of Human Rights, supra note 31.
44
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, supra note 41, at § 12-16.
45
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, supra note 41, at § 50.
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afforded (a right of priority) from the time of application does not necessarily mean that
the property interest involved is absolute.46
The dissenting judges placed weight on the great economic value of the right conferred
by trademark applications47 in contemporary society and recognized a protected property
interest. They seemed inclined to view trademark law in general as wholly unsatisfactory
in the modern world, since they concluded that a result that renders a valuable asset unexploitable in some markets amounts to interference with the peaceful enjoyment of
one’s possessions.48 The dissenters therefore concluded that the Portuguese legislation
failed to strike a fair balance between the public interest sought and the individual
property interest.49
In contrast, the Maori system is premised on a theory of property allocation that hinges
not on the owner or object of the property; in fact these aspects are irrelevant for the
purposes of determining the scope of the right.50 Before being replaced by the British
property system all land was communally owned and the community granted individual
members of the community multiple usufructuary rights.51 Instead of obtaining a piece of

46

Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, supra note 41, at § 47 and 52.
Namely the exclusive right to use the mark for named products in a certain geographic area.
48
Anheuser Busch v. Portugal, supra note 41, Joint dissenting opinion of judges Costa and
Cabral Barreto at § 5: “Although in the present case the applicant company cannot really be said
to have been deprived of ownership of the “Budweiser” mark, as there was no formal or
constructive expropriation, it is nevertheless undeniable that the effect of the decisions of the
domestic courts has been to prevent the applicant company from using the mark in Portugal. Its
total inability to exploit the mark commercially constitutes interference. Such interference must
comply with the rule of law, pursue a legitimate aim and strike a “fair balance” between the
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the
individual’s fundamental rights (Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 58, ECHR 1999-II). It
must be remembered that in the business world, the right to use a mark in a market such as the
Portuguese market may have considerable value.”
49
Anheuser Busch v. Portugal, supra note 41, Joint dissenting opinion of judges Costa and
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land and all rights to it, the Maori had rights to hunt, rights to cultivate land and rights to
pick berries.52 The community owned the geographical space, which allocated and
enforced the usufructuary rights as well as enforced its rights against other
communities.53 Several members thus could hold rights in the same geographical space,
but they were different rights that did not encroach upon each other.54 Members were
encouraged to exercise their rights to their fullest extent without harming others, which
put all land to its most efficient use to service the needs of the community.55 Unlike the
Western system that focuses on the owner, in the Maori system what defines the scope of
the right is its use.
Dressed in trademark terms, as long as the trademark is used to indicate the origin of
goods or services, the owner of the mark is irrelevant for the question of ascertaining
whether the mark is protected or not. In other words the property right is alienable as long
as its function in the overall system of allocation is not altered. The question is purely
whether the use is legitimate in relation to the interests of third parties. The right exists as
long as and to the extent it is used according to the initial allocation.56 Some pushing of
boundaries may occur and is actually desirable in order to maximize the use of all
resources.57 In the event of a conflict whoever furnishes proof of a legitimate interest in
continued use of the disputed subject matter will prevail. Regardless of the outcome of
the dispute, the rights are presumed to coexist to the extent that they do not conflict with
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each other. When the use stops the rights by default revert58 back to the community (i.e.
the government) that can reallocate them to another user or to the public domain.59
Although the current system is arguably based upon similar logic the contemporary
emphasis on individual property rights has clearly overshadowed this premise of
trademark law.60
In sum, all of the decisions referenced above treat property in land differently than other
property interests and are more likely to view the property right in land as one of absolute
ownership. By the same token not all deprivations of land are illegitimate, since only
some trigger the duty of compensation. Hence, absolute ownership does not literally
mean that the rights of the owner are absolute, i.e. not routinely subordinate to the public
interest.61 Consequently, while some rights can be taken away, some rights were never
given in the first place.62 All property rights are thus inherently subject to internal as well
as external limitations.
In comparison a mobile phone consists of patented hardware, copy-righted software, a
protected design and is marketed under a protected trademark. All these rights exist apart
from the property right in the mobile phone itself. This solution caters to needs of the
contemporary dynamic community. Likewise, the Maori system optimally served the
needs of their community, because the same geographic area can not be hunted, grazed or

58

Pending certain circumstances that are specifically set forth in legislation e.g. abandonment,
failure to renew registration etc.
59
After all, it is the government not the individual rights holder that enforces the use rights of the
individual against encroachment from others. See Banner, supra note , 813-814.
60
Compare to Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev.
1031, 1071-1074 (2005). See also Demsetz, supra note 57, at 347.
61
All property systems recognize that property rights are not absolute however there exist great
variances between countries on the extent to which private property rights are subject to
limitations in the public interest. Banner, supra note 50, at 810-811.
62
Compare and contrast the opinions of the majority and minority in Anheuser Busch v. Portugal,
supra note 41, and J.A.Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, supra note 30.

18
cultivated indefinitely or it will be drained. Similarly yet differently, trademark owners
need to constantly develop their trademarks to fit their products and business. The extent
of the actual use therefore rarely completely coincides with the mark that is registered at
any given time. However, the option of fixing the right to a physical object is not
available in trademark law. While the English system that replaced the Maori system was
arguably more efficient, the same system encounters its weaknesses in relation to IPRs.
The physical connection distorts rather than aids the attainment of allocative efficiency
and forces the IPR-system to race between the extremes of insufficient protection of third
parties to insufficient protection of rights holders. A theory of allocation that focuses on
use instead of the owner or object of property rights will allow for a near optimal
allocation of rights on both sides, since it is inherently flexible to the needs of the users as
well as the community.63 In other words a balance is continuously struck between
competing interests both when allocating rights and in resolving conflicts of rights.
What purpose then does the two step deprivation analysis set forth in the South African
case serve in treaty interpretation? Professor Joost Pauwelyn categorizes conflicts that
arise in treaty interpretation as false conflicts, true apparent conflicts and genuine
conflicts.64 In matters of international trademark law a false conflict might arise when
trademark rights are impacted by legislation, however, careful scrutiny reveals that the
trademark owner does not have a legitimate property interest in the subject matter that
has allegedly been deprived. The majority in Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal reached this
63
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conclusion. Likewise the legislation might not legitimately allow a third party to
encroach upon the contested subject matter and hence the apparent conflict of norms was
an illusion.
Unlike false conflicts where the decision turns on the lack of a protected interest on either
side, a true apparent conflict requires the decision-maker to consider the arbitrariness of a
deprivation in light of the public interest, since both parties have legitimate interests in
the contested subject matter. Balancing of interests is required and guidance is sought
from the contextual framework of the conflicting provisions as well as the general rules
of treaty interpretation. A genuine conflict of norms, where the object and purpose of the
agreements or provisions in question are undeniably in conflict, cannot be resolved
through treaty interpretation, but can only be solved by the legislature.65

II.B

The Contents and “Meaning” of an Exclusive Right

As mentioned above the term property in itself bears no legal significance. What is
significant is what rights a property right confers upon its holder. A property right does
not include one right, but a bundle of rights. The traditional bundle includes 1) the right
to lawfully use the property in a certain way; 2) the right to alienate (sell, lend, lease, use
as collateral etc.) and 3) the right to exclude others.66 In one sense a property right is a
right against the world, since it confers enforceable rights to something on the owner. On
the other hand, the contents of the rights in the bundle, differs depending on whom it is
asserted against based on the duties of ownership conferred on the owner in the initial
65
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allocation.67 Neither is the bundle of rights static or constant in effect or character, since
the right itself confers the right on the owner to change the relationship. In this sense the
property right is defined by contracts between the owner and others.68 However, there are
some “inherent defects” in all titles that the owner does not have the power to correct. We
focus on those next.
The property right is necessarily defined by its object. Unlike a plot of land or physical
object, defining the object of intellectual property rights is however notoriously
difficult.69 Most other intangible interests can at least conceptually be tied to some
tangible form of property, which in turn the right can be contrasted against. A bank holds
a mortgage on a house only insofar the debt has not been paid and a shareholder’s interest
is defined by the existence and success of the company as well as the interests of other
shareholders. No one (generally) has a property right in the subject matter from which a
trademark is created; it is taken from the pool of collective resources. At the same time
the object of the right is distinct from the property right in the paper it is printed on, the
web-site that displays it, or the goods to which it is affixed. Any attempt to contrast it to a
tangible resource leads to a misleading result, since they are not connected in the
traditional property law sense.70
Another traditional approach to defining a property right when the resource is taken out
of the common pool is through possession.71 A land owner gained ownership through

67

Waldron, supra note 14, at 27.
When an owner exercises his right to sell or lease the property he automatically restricts his
own right to use the property and exclude others from using it in relation to the contracting party
on the terms set forth in their agreement.
69
Robin Jacob & Daniel Alexander, A Guidebook to Intellectual Property, Patents, Trade Marks,
th
Copyright and Designs 4-5, (5 Edition, 2003).
70
Lemley, supra note 60, at 1033.
71
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property in Perspectives on Property Law (Robert
C. Elickson, Carol M. Rose and Bruce A. Ackerman eds., Third Edition, 2002).
68

21
marking the boundaries of his plot of land and claimed ownership to wild horses by
capturing them and fencing them in. The trademark owner claims a similar right when
initially using the mark in commerce, and if no one else is using the same mark on the
same goods it is quite easy for the public to accept the capture of a specific “plot” on the
market.72 However, much like the neighbor is likely to object when a landowner tries to
expand the boundaries of his property, or the community, when one family captures all
the horses, problems arise when the trademark owner adopts an expansive interpretation
of the right to exclude others. If these conflicts were decided by whoever has possession,
the “encroacher” would naturally have the upper hand.73 However, in a society with
scarce resources these conflicts are generally decided by scrutinizing the original
allocation of property rights for inherent defects in title.74
In other words the trademark right is defined, by weighing it against the public interest
against allocating any right (to the contested subject matter) to begin with. The object of
contention is thus separate from the initial allocation and does not affect the original
grant. In this sense each infringement action turns on whether or not the trademark owner
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has a legitimate expectation in the property interest sought. After all a property right only
has value if it can be enforced against others.75
Legitimacy is derived from the initial grant as set forth by trademark legislation. Article
16.1 of THE TRIPS AGREEMENT affords the trademark owner the following rights:
“The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all
third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade
identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to
those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result
in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical
goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. The rights
described above shall not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect
the possibility of Members making rights available on the basis of use.”
The international minimum standard of trademark protection only applies to registered
marks even though Member States are allowed to afford additional protection based on
use of a mark. The initial76 grant of an exclusive right is thus subject to four inherent
defects in title: the owner can only prevent a third party from 1) using a mark in
commerce; 2) as a trade or service77 mark; 3) on identical or similar goods; 4) where the
use results in a likelihood of confusion. The chosen language clearly indicates that the
factors are cumulative.
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In addition to affording a limited right the TRIPS Agreement acknowledges that the
trademark right confers certain rights and duties on the trademark owner. Member States
may impose a requirement of use (and most do) and renewal in order to maintain the
registration, but a trademark registration shall (in principle) be renewable indefinitely.78
The use of a trademark shall not be unjustifiably burdened with special requirements, nor
can it ever be subject to a compulsory license.79 In addition, licensing and assignment of
a trademark shall be possible with or without transfer of the business to which the
trademark belongs.80

III

THE DEROGATION ALLOWED FROM AFFORDED RIGHTS UNDER
ARTICLE 17

III.A

Introduction

The last section concerned the inherent constraints on the afforded right. This section
concerns the right of the government to regulate in ways that affect the exercise of
trademark rights. The distinction between allocation and exercise of a right is not
necessarily clear in practice. However, national laws generally acknowledge this
distinction through evidentiary rules. Since registration serves as notice on third parties
the legitimacy of the trademark owner’s interest is presumed for what is registered.81 The
trademark owner however bears the burden of proving his entitlement to any additional
protection. Only when the trademark owner has a legitimate interest in the exclusive use
of a mark does the defendant’s duty to furnish evidence in his defense kick in.
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The logic of this analytical structure operates with a twist on the international level.
Under the TRIPS Agreement Member States are only mandated to provide minimum
protection to trademark owners, unless the principles of national treatment or most
favored nation are violated.82 Hence, additional protection is not mandated but a choice
which in turn can trigger certain duties, namely that of equal treatment. The paramount
question of law (when considering the arbitrariness of the deprivation) remains whether
or not the Member State is in violation of its international obligation to provide a
minimum standard of protection for trademarks.
As was the question in the property cases above, the inquiry includes two steps: 1) is a
legitimate property interest at stake and 2) is the deprivation arbitrary or illegitimate?
Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement reads as follows:
“Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark,
such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take account
of the legitimate interests of the trademark owner and of third parties.”
Hence, the exclusive right afforded in Article 16(1), can be subject to limited exceptions.
In other words, in a situation where all four elements of article 16 (1) are satisfied; a mark
is used in commerce on identical or similar goods in a way that causes a likelihood of
confusion, the use may nonetheless be lawful.
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III.B

European Communities- Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications
for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs

III.B.1 Does Article 24 of the TRIPS Agreement Provide an Exception to Trademark
Rights?
The proposed conceptual structure of international trademark law is useful in assessing
the above-mentioned panel report regarding the protection of trademarks and GIs under
the TRIPS Agreement. The GI-report interpreted Articles 24.5, Article 24.3 and Article
17 of THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, since the European Communities raised them as a
defense of its legislation regarding geographical indications83 (GIs), in response to
complaints by Australia and the United States that the EC violated Article 16(1) of THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT.84
The EC legislation confers an implied right to use a GI in relation to the relevant products
upon registration.85 Article 14(2) of the regulation allows for the continued use of
trademarks that were registered prior to the registration of a GI. In addition, Article 14(3)
of the regulation provides that the registration of a GI shall be refused if it leads to a
likelihood of confusion with an earlier trademark. Notwithstanding Article 14 (3) of the
regulation, the main argument set forth by the complainants is that the trademark rights
afforded under Article 16(1) of the TRIPS Agreement cannot be fully exercised against a
person, who uses a registered GI in accordance with the right conferred by registration.86
The EC, on the other hand, claims that Article 14(2) is necessary to implement its
obligations under Article 24 of the TRIPS Agreement.87
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Article 24 sets forth the minimum standard of GI protection in the TRIPS Agreement.
Article 24.5 limits the reach of GI protection that a Member State may afford in relation
to existing trademarks, the exclusive rights to which have been acquired prior to the
protection of the GI in its home country. The Panel rejected the argument that Article
24.5 is exhaustive in the sense that Member States under the TRIPS agreement are free to
limit the use of trademarks that have been acquired after a GI is protected in its home
country.88 Likewise the Panel rejected the argument that a Member State is obligated
under Article 24 to afford such GI protection.89
The Panel concluded that Article 24.5 creates an exception to GI protection mandated by
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT and also, notwithstanding Article 24 that Members States are
required under Article 16(1) to make available the right to exclude certain uses, which
includes uses as a GI.90 The GI-Panel arrived at this conclusion by way of interpreting the
words “when implementing this section” in Article 24.3 and 24.5 to render the conferred
obligations inapplicable in relation to other obligations in the TRIPS Agreement. Since
the obligation to afford trademark protection is found in section 2 of the TRIPS
agreement (without a similar qualifier), any obligation of coexistence cannot be
presumed.91 The GI-Panel concluded that they refuse to adopt an approach to treaty
interpretation, which is not supported by the ordinary meaning of its terms in their
context.92
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III B.2 Exceptions Under Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement
When turning to Article 17 the GI-panel recognized two elements that the national
legislation must satisfy: 1) the exceptions must be limited and 2) must take account of the
legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties. Any interpretation
of either element that excludes the example “fair use of descriptive terms” is necessarily
incorrect.93
The GI-panel noted that it can be instructive to refer to the interpretation by two previous
panels on the interpretation of corresponding articles regarding exceptions to copyrights
and patents.94 However, there are some significant differences between the provisions
that make it important to interpret article 17 according to its own terms. “Unlike the other
provisions Article 17 contains no reference to “conflict with a [or the] normal
exploitation” {or} “unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests” of the …owner,
{instead Article 17 expressly} refers to the legitimate interests of third parties [and] treats
them on par with those of the right holder.” Article 17 clearly permits exceptions that are
not applicable to other intellectual property rights.95
In ascertaining the meaning of the term “limited exceptions” the GI-panel concluded that
the issue is whether the exception to the rights conferred by a trademark is narrow.96
Exceptions may apply to 1) a category of third parties; with respect to 2) the identity or
similarity of the marks or goods; 3) the degree of likelihood of confusion; 4) a
93
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combination of the above; or 5) in some other way, as long as they are limited. The panel
noted that “[f]air use of descriptive terms is not limited in terms of the number of third
parties who may benefit, nor in terms of the quantity of goods or services with respect to
which they use the descriptive terms, although implicitly it only applies to those third
parties who would use those terms in the course of trade and to those foods or services
which those terms describe.” Still, it satisfies the elements of Article 17.97
The number of trademarks or trademark owners affected is irrelevant and the focus
remains on the impact on the rights of the trademark owner.98 Nevertheless, although the
quantity of goods that benefit from an exception might indirectly curtail the exercise of
the right to exclude others, preventing acts of making, selling or importing goods are not
rights conferred by a trademark.99 The trademark right only entails the right to prevent
confusing uses.100 On the other hand, the GI-panel noted that “a GI registration does not
confer a positive right to use any other signs or combinations of signs, nor to use the
name in any linguistic versions” hence the trademark owner’s rights are not limited
against such uses.101 Likewise the GI regulation recognizes a ground for refusal of
registration based on an earlier trademark hence the trademark owner’s right to exclude
confusing uses is not completely diminished even against the GI applicant.102
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III.B. 3.

Legitimate interests

Following a contextual approach the GI-panel concluded that the legitimate interests of
the trademark owner must be something different from the full enjoyment of the rights
conferred by a trademark. Likewise the legitimate interests of third parties must be
something more than simple enjoyment of their legal rights.103 Citing CanadaPharmaceuticals Patents the GI-panel concluded that the provision calls “for protection
of interests that are ‘justifiable’ in the sense that they are supported by relevant public
policies and other social norms”.104
The GI-panel referred to “the WTO Members’ shared understandings of the policies and
norms relevant to trademarks”, when concluding that the protected function of
trademarks is the ability to distinguish goods and services from those of other companies
in the course of trade.105 While it is in the legitimate interest of the trademark owner to
receive protection of the source identifying function of its trademark, protection is not
absolute.106 In contrast to Articles 13, 26.2 and 30 that refer to “unreasonable prejudice”,
Article 17 requires only that exceptions “take account” of the legitimate interests of the
owner. According to the GI-panel the chosen wording hence suggests that less protection
is required for the legitimate interests of the trademark owner.107 This reading also
corresponds with the absence of specific reference to the rights of third parties in Articles
13, 26.2 and 30.
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The GI-panel further notes that the relevant third parties for the purposes of Article 17
include both consumers and persons using a geographical indication.108 After all the
legitimacy of the interests of GI users is reflected in the TRIPS Agreement itself. The
Panel defines the legitimate interest of GI owners by contrasting Articles 22 and 23 of the
TRIPS Agreement, in which protection of GIs is afforded.109 Furthermore, the GI-panel
analogizes to the example in Article 17 concluding that GI protection serves a similar
purpose and is therefore legitimate.110

IV

THE CONTEXTUAL AND STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT

IV.A. The Framework of International Law and International Trade

The TRIPS Agreement is part of a larger framework of treaties that regulate international
trade under the auspices of the WTO.111 Hence, the underlying purpose of the TRIPS
Agreement is to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade. The means
employed to reach the goal are securing effective and adequate protection of IPRs, while
ensuring that the measures and procedures to enforce IPRs do not themselves become
barriers to legitimate trade.112 According to Article 7 the objective of the TRIPS
Agreement is “to contribute to the promotion of technological innovation […] to the
mutual advantage of producers and users […] in a manner conducive to the social and
108
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economic welfare, and balance of rights and obligations.” Furthermore, Article 8 shows
deference to Member States in formulating and amending laws and adopting measures
necessary to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development. With the objective and purpose of the TRIPS
Agreement in mind the Member States adopted the following international obligation:
Article 1
Nature and Scope of Obligations
“1. Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may,
but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than
is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene
the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their
own legal system and practice.”
Adopting minimum standards of protection follows the traditional format of international
agreements, after all it is notoriously difficult to reach consensus on an adequate level of
protection between more than 150 different legal systems and maintain a level that has
any practical effect.113 In addition, great deference is shown to the Member States in
implementing the provisions of the treaty both relating to means chosen as well as to the
level of protection in practice, provided that it is higher than the minimum level of
protection.114 Lastly, it should be noted that while agreement was reached on the issue of
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granting protection, the issue of when the rights afforded under the TRIPS Agreement are
exhausted was expressly excluded.115
To give added force to the international trade rules, the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) was annexed to the agreement
establishing the WTO, to govern all disputes between Member States.116 DSU Article 3.2
states that the WTO dispute settlement system, “serves to preserve the rights and
obligations of Members under the…agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law.” Recommendations and rulings cannot add or diminish those rights and
obligations.117 In United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
the Appellate Body confirmed that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties incorporates the customary rules of public international law.118
Customary rules of public international law mandate that “a treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its objective and purpose”.119 The relevant context
comprises of the text, preamble and annexes as well as any other agreement relating to
the treaty between the same parties.120 Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation
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is only allowed when the contextual interpretation leaves the meaning ambiguous or leads
to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result.121 Customary international law thus
provides different tools of interpretation for different conflicts within international
jurisdiction, as well as, draws the line between national and international jurisdiction.122
The requirement of good faith interpretation has traditionally been construed to mandate
narrow interpretation of treaty provisions and excluding e contrario conclusions
regarding the intentions of Member States in international law.123 On the other hand, the
contextual approach in light of the objective and purpose of the treaty secures an
interpretation that gives all provisions some effect. The universally recognized principle
of pacta sunt servanda mandates that the text of the treaty is binding upon the parties and
cannot be watered down by subsequent interpretation.124
In sum, international law operates much like contract law, which is premised on the
principles of contractual freedom on the one hand and strict (legal or diplomatic)
enforcement of contractual obligations on the other hand. A backdrop of commitment to
the system of international law, however, does not allow for parties to opt out of all of
their obligations. Because there is no hierarchy of treaties the unity of international law is
what lends legitimacy and democratic content to international law. Hence, unless a
Member State explicitly contracts out of an international obligation it is presumptively
bound by that obligation in all other contractual relationships.125
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IV.B. The Evolution of International Norms and the Status of WTO Panel Reports
The function of WTO panels is to assist the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) by making
an objective assessment of the facts at hand and their applicability and conformity with
the relevant agreements.126 Nowadays, WTO panel reports as well as Appellate Body
reports are semi-automatically adopted by the DSB and subsequently obtain the status of
an authoritative statement of international law.127 How then should the WTO Panel
reports be interpreted and what reach should the rulings be given?
The main concern in this section is to ascertain the binding force or effect of a Panel
ruling as a contribution to the body of international trade law.128 According to the DSU
the purpose of the dispute settlement system and hence the rulings set forth by it is to
provide “security and predictability to the multilateral trading system”.129 Much like any
other decision-making body in a rule-oriented (as opposed to policy-based) system, the
WTO system cannot be successful unless three goals are met: The system must be viewed
by the Member States as 1) just, 2) credible as well as 3) efficient.130 All panel rulings as
well as their reasoning are thus subject to intense scrutiny. Consequently, WTO Panels
have sought to adopt an analytical, objective and non-political procedure that is firmly
anchored in principles of international law.131 While clearly aware of their larger
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audience in aspects of procedure and form it seems unclear what substantive reach
(source value) is to be given to the rulings of WTO panels.132
Due to the above-mentioned concerns the approach of WTO panels is necessarily
formalistic in the sense that panels will rely heavily on treaty text as well as perceived
neutral sources of interpretation. Certain WTO panels have, however, taken a highly
formalistic, almost exclusively literal approach to interpretation of the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement.133 What weight should these reports or statements be given as a
source of law?
In Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages the Appellate Body considered whether prior
reports constitute “subsequent practice” for purposes of treaty interpretation within the
meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.134 The Appellate Body held that the
decision to adopt a panel report neither constitutes agreement on the reasoning by that
panel nor elevates the report to a binding source of law on subsequent panels.135 Reports
are only binding with respect to resolving a particular dispute between the parties.
Nevertheless, panel reports should be taken into account because they may create
legitimate expectations among Member States.136
Furthermore, the correct interpretative approach under the Vienna Convention follows
the general principle of effectiveness of treaty interpretation.137 Although the correct
approach to any provision is textual, interpretation should always rest on the objective
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and purpose of provisions; i.e. respecting the words while not diminishing the meaning of
words actually used in other provisions. Any provision should be read in light of the
broad and fundamental purpose of that provision that gives meaning and effect to all of
its terms.138
The Appellate Body has further elaborated on rules of treaty interpretation in US-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.139 Any measure that is subject to a
violation140 complaint should be scrutinized in light of its meaning and effect in relation
to the relevant international obligations of the Member State in question, not with a focus
on the nature or design of the measure itself.141 Furthermore, maintaining the multilateral
trading system is not a right or obligation per se, instead each provision should be
reviewed in light of the object and purpose of the provision itself. Thus, generally testing
a measure for consistency with the object and purpose of the treaty exceeds the
jurisdiction of panels.142 Nevertheless, the result of the interpretative approach must lead
to a test or standard that is justifiable under the agreement.143 Consequently, absent
express wording on point, terms of the treaty must nonetheless be read in light of
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contemporary concerns among the Member States as expressed, e.g., in the preamble of
the agreement.144
Finally, the Appellate Body has expressly stated that Member States “should not be
assumed…to have continued previous protection or discrimination through the adoption
of a new measure”, since this would amount to a presumption of bad faith that is
inconsistent with the general nature of international law.145 However, the policy goal of a
measure, no matter how noble, cannot provide its justification, if it does not meet the
general requirements for an exemption.146 Total deference to Member States cannot
ensure an objective assessment under Article 3.2 of the DSU.147
In any search for a meaning of a treaty, treaty interpretation should be seen as a tool for
conflict avoidance.148 As mentioned above, conflicts can generally be categorized as false
conflicts, true apparent conflicts and genuine conflicts.149 While the former two can be
solved by recourse to treaty interpretation, genuine conflicts are outside the jurisdiction
of WTO Panels.150 However, no conflict can even hypothetically exist if 1) the language
of the provision in question is not broad or ambiguous enough to allow input from other
provisions regarding its meaning, or 2) the second rule in question does not express
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anything about what the first one means.151 This rule stems from the prohibition under
customary international law of interpretations contra legem.152
False conflicts can be solved by reference to the principle of efficient treaty
interpretation. The provisions are interpreted in good faith in light of their objective and
purpose. No provision can justify a meaning that would be contrary to the letter and spirit
of the provisions.153 Hence, words can neither be interpreted into nor out of a treaty
provision.154 Efficient treaty interpretation is only permissible, to the extent that a
harmonious result can be reached. Whether the result is in favor of the first or second
provision is irrelevant.
True conflicts, on the other hand, require reference to norms outside the text of the treaty
in order to determine whether the solution of the conflict is within international
jurisdiction.155 True apparent conflicts generally are within international jurisdiction
(although decision-making authority can have been withheld from the WTO Panels).
However, genuine conflicts can only be resolved by way of amendment of the treaty.156

V.

EVALUATION OF THE GI-PANEL REPORT IN LIGHT OF THE PROPOSED
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The GI-panel arguably was in a difficult position, since the collision between the interests
of trademark owners and GI owners are one of the most contested issues in the
international arena. In its final analysis the GI-panel correctly focused the analysis on the
151
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rights afforded and the effect of the limitation on the underlying property interest. The
GI-panel however failed to distinguish the rights afforded from those withheld in relation
to GI holders157 and consequently failed to distinguish between deprivations per se
(exceptions that should not be analyzed under Article 17, because no legitimate property
interest is deprived) and arbitrary or illegitimate deprivations (exceptions that should be
analyzed under Article 17).
In other words, the GI-panel should have asked whether trademark owners have a
legitimate interest in excluding GI users and weighed this interest against the legitimacy
of the interest of GI users in receiving protection. At this juncture, the GI-panel should
have distinguished between the legitimate interests of existing trademark owners and
prospective trademark owners in the relevant market and accordingly weighed how the
regulation protected their respective interests against existing GI users and prospective GI
users in turn. After all, sweeping generalizations regarding the legitimate interest of the
trademark owner as well as a GI owner are unadvisable; since they like all property
rights, vary according to whom it is asserted against. The distinction is supported by the
text of the treaty since Article 24.5; the exception to GI protection in favor of trademark
owners, only applies to existing trademark owners in relation to prospective GI users. A
reading that does not make the distinction renders Article 24.5 meaningless, a conclusion
that can never be supported under the international rules on treaty interpretation.158
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Secondly, Article 17 clearly includes a static dimension, i.e. Member States are allowed
to maintain existing limitations on trademark rights. The question to what extent Member
States are allowed to introduce new exceptions to trademark rights under the TRIPS
Agreement is arguably more controversial.159
Despite the adopted contextual approach, the GI-panel arguably treated Article 17 as well
as the TRIPS Agreement itself as only including a static dimension; i.e. a fixed allocation
of rights and duties. The GI-panel took the standard of protection expressed in the TRIPS
Agreement as the starting point for its analysis when evaluating whether the exceptions
were limited and whether the interests of the parties were legitimate. Hence, the limited
scope of the exception was ascertained by contrasting it to the international minimum
standard of protection; and the legitimacy of interests of third parties was ascertained by
equating the interest to the international minimum standard of protection and subjecting it
to the provisio of Article 17.
Member States are however entitled as well as encouraged to grant more protection for
IPRs than the international minimum standard set forth in the TRIPS Agreement.160 Most
Western nations do, and the Member States of the European Community grant higher
levels of protection to both trademarks and GIs than mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.
159
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In other words, while the TRIPS Agreement mandates that Member States afford some
level of protection for trademarks as well as GIs, an e contrario conclusion is not
permissible under international law: the TRIPS Agreement does not mandate protection
only to the extent afforded by its provisions.
The GI-panel treated the minimum standard of protection afforded to GIs under the
TRIPS Agreement as a ‘ceiling’ in the sense that it only recognized these interests as
legitimate, and analytically subordinated these interests to those of trademark owners by
viewing minimum GI protection as an exception. Regardless of emphasis to the contrary
the GI-panel, as panels before it had done regarding copyright and patents, used a
standard similar to viewing third party use as interfering with “normal exploitation” or
creating “unreasonable prejudice” to the interests of the trademark owner. However,
Article 17 explicitly shows deference to national legislatures to strike a fair balance
between competing equal interests.161 A proper inquiry under international law would
have treated the protection afforded to GIs under the TRIPS Agreement as a ‘floor’ and
scrutinized only the legitimacy of interests behind national legislation granting additional
protection in light of the international minimum standard of trademark protection.
The theory of allocation of trademark rights based on a use-based property system
explains the relationships between rights embedded in the TRIPS Agreement. Keeping in
mind the necessary link between property rights’ allocation and enforcement it is
inevitable that only governments can allocate trademark rights for their respective
territories.162 It is within national jurisdiction to strike the final balance between the rights
of trademark owners and third parties, since genuine conflicts can only be solved
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internationally by consensus, i.e. treaty amendment. In striking this balance international
law mandates that some, not absolute, protection be given to IPRs.
On the other hand, international law is the flip side of national law; obligations are
allocated instead of rights. Contrary to the findings of the GI-panel, it therefore naturally
follows that the coexistence of all obligations is the norm.163 After all, a contract is
meaningless, if a signatory can reap the benefits of international cooperation, but opt out
of its obligations. Hence an international instrument cannot be interpreted to allow one or
some rights allocations at the national level to become supreme without destroying the
system of international law. Instead all treaty interpretation should rest on the
presumption of coexistence and conflict avoidance.
VI

CONCLUSION

The TRIPS Agreement does not create an island of international intellectual property law
that is isolated from both national and general international law. Instead its provisions
should be interpreted in light of the agreement as a whole as well as its practical and
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contextual framework, according to established principles of customary international law.
There are inherent limits to treaty interpretation imbedded in the rules of international
jurisdiction and generally great deference should be shown to national legislatures in
implementing the country’s international obligations.
Viewing trademark rights as property rights can be both helpful and misleading on the
international level. Acknowledging that property rights are inherently relational as well as
subject to limitation in the public interest may prove useful when interpreting the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, especially when the interests of holders of different
IPRs are in potential conflict. Approaching the TRIPS Agreement as a complex system of
rights allocation, instead of from the point of view of the individual rights holder, results
in a more efficient use of all resources. A system premised on the coexistence of multiple
users of closely connected, yet distinguishable rights, naturally produces the most
efficient result that the market can sustain.
WTO Panels should therefore tread carefully in areas of political contention; applying a
contextual approach to treaty interpretation based on an objective assessment of the
obligations in the concluded agreement. Although the allocation of obligations in the
TRIPS Agreement in this sense is static, interpretation should remain flexible for the
purposes of continued development of national legislation in the field of intellectual
property law. Promoting the gradual increase in standards of protection of IPRs on the
global level is, after all, the objective and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement.

